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LAW AND DISPUTING IN
COMMERCIALIZING EARLY AMERICA
CorneliaDayton*
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS:

CONNECTICUT.

LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY

By Bruce H. Mann. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 202. $27.50.
Bruce Mann's study of civil litigation and forms of disputing in

early Connecticut is highly readable, tightly composed, and elegantly
argued. It would stand out as a model case study illuminating changes

in legal culture even if it were surrounded by a host of older
monographs on other colonial jurisdictions. But Mann's distinctive
approach and original findings give his book heightened importance
for the field of American legal history. Few scholars who have gone

before him have so successfully tackled longitudinal analyses of litigation patterns, and few have treated the colonial period as other than a

static precursor to modem, "formative" developments in American
law.1 By linking his own careful analysis of civil suits, arbitrations,
and church disciplinary proceedings with recent historians' work on
economic and social change in New England, Mann shows that the
experience of disputing changed in profound ways for the average
New Englander between the middle of the Seventeenth century and the
eve of the American Revolution.
Neighbors and Strangers focuses on civil law, forgoing any discussion of criminal prosecution patterns. There are two good reasons for

this. First, scholars are by now quite familiar with the changes in
criminal law enforcement and punishment in the colonial period.2
* Assistant Professor of History, University of California, Irvine. A.B. 1979, Harvard-Radcliffe College; Ph.D. 1986, Princeton University. - Ed.
1. As a model study of civil litigation at the level of local courts, Mann's book ranks with R.
SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE BOSTON TRIAL COURTS,

1880-1900 (1981). As a serious study of law and change in the colonial period, Neighbors and
Strangersjoins a handful of fine, recent monographs and extended essays. See, e.g., D. GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK,

1691-1776 (1976); D.

KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692 (1979);
M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986); Hartog, The
Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282 (1976); Marcus, "Due Execution of the Generall Rules of Righteousness" CriminalProceduresin New Haven Town and Colony, 1638-1658, in SAINTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (D. Hall, J. Murrin & T. Tate eds.
1984); and Murrin, Magistrates, Sinners, anda PrecariousLiberty: Trial by Jury in SeventeenthCentury New England, in id. at 152.
2. See D. GREENBERG, supranote 1; Marcus, supra note 1; see also E.POWERS, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1692 (1966); Flaherty, Crime and Social Con-
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Second, after a period of several decades in the seventeenth century
when the lines between criminal and civil cases were blurred, privately
initiated suits began to outnumber criminal cases by increasing margins in all jurisdictions. Thus Mann can justifiably claim that, especially in the eighteenth century, it was the civil law, not the criminal
law, that touched the most people (p. 6). Faced with a literature lacking any in-depth study of civil litigation ("the vast majority of court
business" between 1700 and the Revolution), Mann aims to "redress
3
the imbalance."
The backbone of Mann's book is found in his first three chapters,
which analyze trends in civil litigation, especially debt litigation.
Mann's interpretation draws on a coded sample of 5317 civil cases in
the Hartford and New London county courts, as well as his reading
and knowledge of "several hundred other cases from elsewhere in the
colony," principally from New Haven county (p. 7). The data comprise the most extensive and revealing portrait of what went on in
early American county courts to date. Mann presents his quantitative
evidence unobtrusively, placing all the tables in an appendix, and
weaving crucial statistical findings into the text. Best of all, Mann is a
good storyteller, with an ear for the telling case, the litigant's lament,
or the statutory decree that etches in bold relief the story of change
told by the numbers.
If Mann's fourth and fifth chapters rest on more fragmentary evidence, it is through no fault of his own. No official records of arbitration proceedings were kept and few survive; Mann has performed
quite a feat in combing through the hundreds of petitions submitted to
the Connecticut legislature by disappointed civil litigants hoping for
equitable relief or new trials. Among these he has uncovered eightynine cases that shed light on changes in the arbitration process, the
subject of chapter four. In chapter five Mann describes two alternate
forums for dispute resolution that Connecticut denizens might have
trol in ProvincialMassachusetts, 24 HIsr. J. 339 (1981); Hoffer, Introduction, in CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA ix (P. Hofler & W. Scott eds. 1984); Kealey, Patterns of
Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 163 (1986);
Roetger, The Transformation of Sexual Morality in "Puritan"New England: Evidence from the
New Haven Court Records, 1639-1698, 15 CANADIAN RiV. AM. STUD. 243 (1984); Spindel &
Thomas, Crime and Society in North Carolina,1663-1740, 49 J. S. Hisr. 223 (1983); Faber, The
Evil that Men Do: Crime and Transgression in Colonial Massachusetts (1974) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University). The scholarship on criminal justice in early modem and eighteenthcentury England is even more extensive and more analytically advanced. See J. BEATrE, CRIME
AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 (1986); Innes & Styles, The Crime Wave: Recent
Writing on Crime and CriminalJustice in Eighteenth-Century England, 25 J. BRrr. STUD. 380

(1986).
3. Pp. 6-7. Curiously, Mann omits any discussion in his text or footnotes of William E.
Nelson's Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825, a short

study that argues that Plymouth residents before the 1790s resided in cohesive communities and
chose to settle their neighborly disputes in front of their church congregations instead of in
county court. W. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLIcr RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY,
MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825 (1981).
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sought to expand: an ad hoe equity court created by the Assembly in
1717 to try one complex debt case, and an ecclesiastical hearing of a
dispute between two church members. The experiment with a separate equity court was never repeated, and Mann draws on the few series of surviving church discipline records to show that by the mideighteenth century church-sponsored hearings had shed their informal, private, conciliatory tone and assumed the procedural trappings
of the secular courts. These two chapters testify to Mann's resourceful
use of seemingly lost and intractable records. Even more significantly,
they illustrate how legal anthropology persuaded one "law and society" historian to look within and beyond official court records for evidence on the whole spectrum of a society's methods of resolving
disputes.
Overall, Mann posits "a transformation from a legal system that
allowed litigants to address their grievances in ways that were essentially communal to one that elevated predictability and uniformity of
legal relations over responsiveness to individual communities" (pp. 910). By the mid-eighteenth century, ordinary litigants no longer had
available to them a legal system whose rules and structure assumed
the uniqueness of individual disputes, insisted on lay pleading, and
promoted the airing of grievances among neighbors. Instead, external
changes -

notably in economic relations -

and internal changes

-

in rules of courtroom procedure and in the growing necessity for lawyers - had transformed the system. Once privileged, "neighborly"
modes of resolving disputes were displaced by rationalized modes that
met the needs of an expanding commercial economy. In effect, the
legal system now "treated neighbors and strangers alike" (p. 10).

Mann explains this complex shift away from a communal model of
disputing by identifying three crucial areas of change: (1) the economy and the nature of credit relations, and how these structured lawsuits over debt; (2) legal culture, or the ordinary litigant's experience
in court; and (3) the fate of arbitration and church hearings, those two
"quintessentially communal" forums for resolving disputes that existed outside the formal court system (pp. 164-68).
Perhaps the single most original and important contribution Mann
makes to our understanding of the interdependence of law, economy,
and community in early America is his explication of the shift from
book debt to written instruments. Until the 1710s, "book debts were
the primary method of contracting debt obligations" in the Connecticut countryside, and book debt actions constituted a large majority of
the civil actions on county court dockets (p. 26). Since they were

short of specie and since their government did not issue any paper
money until 1709, Connecticut inhabitants paid for merchandise and
services with their own agricultural produce and labor. They reckoned the value of those exchanges in pounds, shillings, and pence, and
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recorded their face-to-face dealings in the ledgers or account books
kept by nearly every farmer, household head, artisan, or merchant.
Such book accounts contained no express promise to pay by a certain
date; they did not bear interest; and, as running accounts, they typically accumulated for several years before the creditor attempted to
collect the balance due.
When a dispute over a book debt ended up in court, the parties
typically pleaded under the general issue and submitted their cases to
the jury for decision. Given the nature of book debt and of their favored plea, the parties could raise in court whatever factual evidence
pertaining to their business transactions and general relationship they
believed to be relevant. Thus, "[tihe procedural and evidentiary flexibility of book debt invited the parties to explain their dispute in ways
that would place the legal issue of indebtedness in the larger context of
their social relations" (p. 23). While Mann concedes that most book
debt actions were straightforward efforts to collect sums due, he demonstrates that in many cases suits were excuses to air long-festering
grievances between individuals or families who, given the texture of
life in the small villages of early New England, "knew one another in a
variety of contexts": not just as economic associates, but as neighbors,
kin, fellow church members or militiamen, "rivals for the affection of
the same widow, parents whose children had quarreled or whose livestock had eaten each other's grain" (p. 18). In arguing that book debt
actions performed social as well as economic functions, Mann draws
on the insights of anthropology. In small, face-to-face communities
where familial and economic survival rests on mutually dependent relations among neighbors, the ability to air a range of accumulated
grievances, even if they are not all immediately adjudicated, permits
villagers to resume their neighborly relations of daily interaction and
exchange (pp. 19-26).
After the first decade of the eighteenth century, book debt was increasingly eclipsed by "a very different kind of debt obligation" (p. 28)
- formal, written instruments such as conditional bonds or promissory notes, each representing a single economic transaction and binding the debtor to pay a specific sum by a given date. The predictability
and assignability of these signed instruments made them particularly
attractive to creditors. A debtor could challenge a written obligation
only by contending the instrument was not his or her deed, whereas
book accounts could be challenged on all sorts of grounds. Thus, the
collection of notes and bonds took on a high degree of certainty, and
debt actions of this nature could not readily stand in for noneconomic
disputes. Spurred to expand their surplus production by a booming
economy driven by the coastal and West Indies trade, Connecticut
farmers welcomed the new debt instruments because creditors now
could advance cash - the colony's newly printed paper currency and that cash could purchase new land or tools, seed or livestock. But
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farmers and artisans were not simply debtors. Promissory notes, the
most common form of the new written instruments, were assignable,
and they circulated almost like currency. Most household heads still
kept a book of running accounts, but they also held notes for small
sums due, and at any one time, owed several debts by note.
In Mann's formulation, a new credit regime, one in which book
debt took a back seat, had taken hold in the Connecticut countryside
by the 1730s. Most inhabitants found notes and bonds to be serviceable credit instruments, and they often found themselves holding notes
due from persons who lived one or two towns away, persons with
whom they had no other ties. This "lengthening... geographic reach
of credit relations" (p. 54) meant that more and more often the ties
between creditor and debtor were "impersonal" (p. 43); thus the par-

ties rarely had reason to use debt litigation to air personal grievances.
Indeed, Mann shows that the proportion of contested actions dropped
precipitously after 1710 (Table 2). The court records make it clear
that by mid-century, litigation had become chiefly a recording device
for rationalized debt collection: debtors defaulted or confessed judgment in over 90% of the cases, and creditors waited to execute those
easily won judgments until they wished to call in the debt (pp. 39-40).
Mann characterizes the mid-eighteenth-century Connecticut legal
system as "formalistic" because of a set of three interrelated courtroom changes which coincided with the transformation in the structure of credit relations. It was in the 1710s that judges and lawmakers
began to insist that stricter rules of "orderly pleading" and legal procedure be enforced. Such rules brought colonial courtroom procedure
and the drawing up of writs more into line with English common law
practice, though colonial legal forms still lacked the complexity of
those of the mother country. Moreover, it was also during this period
that defendants in contested suits abandoned their almost universal
practice of pleading the general issue and began to submit dilatory
pleas or demurrers. Over the next fifty years, only twenty to thirty
percent of defendants broached the merits of their cases by pleading
the general issue. Most of the time, courtroom disputes turned not on
factual issues but on technical and abstract legal issues (pp. 83-84).
Two things followed from this change in the formality and structure of pleading. First, the role ofjuries in deciding civil suits declined
sharply. This was dictated partly by the rise of technical and narrow
pleadings which specifically precluded resort to juries, and partly because litigants chose less frequently to submit applicable cases to juries. Whereas in the 1690s juries had decided most civil actions, by
1745 judges decided more than 80% of contested civil suits (p. 75). In

Mann's eyes, the Connecticut legal system thereby lost one of the key
aspects of its communal nature. Jurors had once brought community
knowledge and norms to bear on most courtroom disputes, but in the
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eighteenth century they were rarely called upon to serve that "mediating function between law and society" (p. 75).
Formal pleadings also brought professional lawyers into court in
significant numbers for the first time. County courts began licensing
attorneys to their bars in 1708, and Mann is able to document that
litigants, who in the seventeenth century bad felt competent to plead
their own cases, now were often confused by the stricter rules of pleading and increasingly hired lawyers. In turn, lawyers skilled in courtroom pleading strategies undoubtedly educated and pressured many
litigants into using dilatory tactics. While many New Englanders continued to represent themselves in court, the typical contested civil action by mid-century featured two attorneys for each party; trials had
turned into "duels between opposing lawyers" (p. 99).
In Neighbors and Strangers, Mann is demanding, in essence, that
American legal historians and colonial historians come to terms with
two critical eighteenth-century developments: the emergence of a culturally powerful, formalistic, rationalized legal system, and the redefinition of community in New England. Mann finds final confirmation
of these developments in changes occurring outside the official courts.
Arbitration proceedings - which were attractive to seventeenth-century New Englanders for their flexible and equitable remedies, their
semi-private nature, their low costs, and their emphasis on reconciliation and the mutuality of awards - were in trouble in the early eighteenth century. From fragmentary documentation, Mann infers that
arbitrators, who traditionally wielded no sanctions other than community pressure, were increasingly unable to secure compliance with
awards. Disputants resorted to a variety of devices to enforce performance - deeds, the exchange of conditioned bonds, and finally depositing promissory notes with the arbitrators (pp. 111-17). By the
mid-eighteenth century the arbitration process was scarcely distinct
from official courtroom adjudication in nature or result. Disputants
used lawyers, sworn witnesses, and sophisticated tactics; winners garnered only monetary awards, not the individually tailored, multifaceted awards of yore. 4 Furthermore, church-sponsored hearings of
disputes were increasingly held to standards of "procedural rigor" (p.
149). That both religious leaders and community arbitrators were invoking legal language and forms as a source of authority is testimony,
Mann argues, to "the growing hegemony of the formal legal system
over the ways in which people resolved their differences" (p. 168).
For Mann, the critical context for the shift away from informal,
communal modes of dispute resolution lies in the changing nature of
community in eighteenth-century New England. Mann eschews the
4. Readers who have previously relied upon Mann's article, The Formalizationof Informal
Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 443 (1984), should be
aware that his analysis of arbitration in chapter 4 of his book contains substantive revisions.
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concept of "decline" in community, preferring the notion of community redefined. Summing up the literature on New England communities, Mann notes that towns, the primary local unit in seventeenthcentury New England, ceased to be cohesive, homogeneous, "groupminded" entities in the eighteenth century. Population growth, pressure on the land, religious dissent, and land speculation promoted the
settlement of many new towns and outlying parishes (pp. 110-11, 16667). The neighborhood parish, rather than the town, became the relevant local community for mid-eighteenth-century New Englanders.
Moreover, the rhythms and needs of the local community no longer
shaped New Englanders' legal experience; law was more responsive to
the needs of the larger society, embodied most notably in the state and
the world of merchants. Formal, standardized legal procedures not
only lent certainty to commercial transactions "between strangers,"
but also created a common framework under which denizens of an
increasingly pluralistic society could settle civil disputes. While local
life and loyalties were still important to New Englanders in 1750, colonists were beginning to perceive that within a diverse society they were
tied to other communities which transcended local boundaries. These
communities - of credit, of occupational ties, and of shared religious
belief - could all resort to a common method of settling disputes, a
common language of law (pp. 167-69).
Mann's skillful presentation of the years between 1690 and 1750 as
a decisive era of change in American law raises several important
questions for future research. The most obvious line of inquiry would
focus on developments in other regions. To what extent did the set of
interrelated events identified by Mann (the shift from book debts to
notes and bonds, the decline of contested and juried cases, the disappearance of lay pleading, and the emphasis on procedural rigor) occur
in courtrooms outside of Connecticut?5
Second, who were the losers in the changes described by Mann?
Where did Connecticut neighbors take their multifaceted, personal
disputes once the very scale of judicial business 6 and the formality of
pleading made the county court a rather intimidating, unwelcoming
forum? Mann suggests that we look to the courts of local justices of
the peace, where villagers were able'to air and reconcile escalating dis5. Answering this question would entail conducting archival research at the level of local
jurisdictions, because court and civil procedures were neither standardized nor clearly explicated
before legal treatises, manuals, and state reporters began to roll off American printing presses in
the early nineteenth century.
6. My own research on the New Haven County Court shows that between the 1750s (when
the annual civil caseload settled at a plateau of about 150 cases) and the Revolution, litigation
rates more than quadrupled. In 1775 the New Haven county civil caseload peaked for the colonial period at 865 suits. For the years immediately preceding 1775 the average annual caseload
was nearly 700 suits. In these years the docket was so large that the bench sat at some sessions

for as long as four weeks.

May 1989]

Law and Disputing

1545

putes without waiting months before a hearing. 7 At the same time,
Mann's general analysis of law and community suggests another answer. As the nature of community changed and families became less
oriented toward their towns and more oriented toward kin, business
associates, and co-religionists nearby or several towns away, attitudes
toward the propriety of expressing anger in public and airing complex,
personal disputes in the public theatre of the courtroom may have
changed significantly. We know that eighteenth-century families increasingly aspired to gentility through the elaboration of rooms and
decorative objects in their houses; these new notions of display and
privacy were also expressed in the public institutions of church and
court. For example, the increased emphasis on the primacy of the
family unit was clearly signalled in New England culture when
churches rearranged their seating patterns: Men and women of the
community no longer entered by separate doors and sat in separate
sections by rank, but instead families filed in and out of church together and sat in reserved family pews. When the moral reputation of
family members was at stake, eighteenth-century families less frequently chose to submit their grievances - in the guise of slander or
paternity suits, for example - to the county courts. 8 By integrating
our analyses of debt and slander litigation, and of civil and criminal
caseloads, we should be able to illuminate further the extent to which
the new legal climate identified by Mann shut out potential litigants,
and the extent to which New Englanders withdrew certain disputes
from the courts because of changing perceptions of family, community, and law.
Finally, what were the implications of the changed eighteenth-century legal system for the American Revolution? As Mann suggests at
the end of his book, if rationalized courtroom procedures and formalistic modes of settling disputes had developed in most colonies by the
1760s, then the mirror of legal culture may have provided inhabitants
of the disparate colonies with a reflected vision of themselves as a potentially national people (p. 168). On the other hand, we might
surmise that a legal system that was no longer responsive to the local
7. Pp. 57-58. Indeed, scholars and archivists need to increase their efforts to identify justice
court records that presumably lie uncatalogued and unnoticed within collections of family papers. As we come to understand in more detail the changing workloads of eighteenth-century
county courts, our hypotheses about the social implications of those changes will be convincing
only if we know what was happening in the more informal courts held by single justices. Laurel
Thatcher Ulrich made this point dramatically clear in a recent paper. See Ulrich, Midwife's
Testimony: New Evidence from the Diary of Martha Moore Ballard, 1785-1812 (presented at
the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Reno, Mar. 24-27, 1988).
8. These are themes I begin to develop in my analysis of litigation and prosecution patterns
in the eighteenth-century New Haven County Court. See Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Community in Connecticut, 1710-1790 (1986) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University). For a somewhat different formulation of similar themes based on a wide range of
printed court records, see Wall, Private Lives: The Transformation of Family and Community
in Early America (1983) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
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community had little to offer certain groups not operating within the
new credit regime - all but the wealthiest women, the strolling poor,
the illiterate, and others disadvantaged by race, ethnic background, or
other social prejudices. With little reason to resort to the courts in the
late eighteenth century, such groups were excluded from the actual
and symbolic civic education and membership that came with court
participation. 9 The national community of legal citizens defined by
the newly rationalized, commercially oriented legal system silently
matched and reinforced the exclusions based on race, gender, and
property-holding which accompanied the revolutionary and constitutional settlement.
As a thoughtful extended essay on the relationship of law and
community, Neighbors and Strangers has much to tell us about the
economic, social, and political lives of early Americans. As a sustained argument for the emergence by 1750 of a legal system geared to
serve the interests of a commercial (or capitalist) political economy,
Mann's study challenges Morton Horwitz's familiar schema 0 and demands that we reconsider the ways in which we evaluate the stages of
American legal development.

9. While court records provide few reliable internal markers for tracing such groups as free
blacks and the poor, the participation of women in civil litigation can be charted. In one Connecticut jurisdiction the declining presence of women in what I call the "litigated economy" is
clear: In New Haven County, the percentage of civil suits (predominantly over debt) involving
female litigants dropped from 20% in the 1710s to 5% in the early 1770s. See Dayton, supra
note 8, at ch. 2.
10. In his extremely influential book, The Transformation ofAmerican Law, Horwitz argues
that the seventy years after the American Revolution saw the most significant transformation in
the American legal system. In that period, Horwitz maintains, "[l]aw, once conceived of as
protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of
the community," came to be shaped into an instrumental force by "men of commerce and industry" so that common law policy would facilitate and promote "the existing organization of eco-

nomic and political power." M.
1860, 253 (1977).

HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1780-

